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This paper demonstrates the way in which stock-flow matching with endogenous seller
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bidders remaining from the last house sale. If two or more bidders remain, the seller obtains
the gains to trade through competitive bidding. The market is active. With one monopolistic
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1 Introduction
Housing markets, like labor and other markets with trading frictions, often appear to experience
prolonged spells of high and low turnover. Although details vary across markets and over time,
the general finding is that during high volume periods, prices are high and the time to trade
short. When turnover becomes slack, prices are low, if exchange occurs at all, and traders
spend a seemingly long time on the market. As a result, prices and sales become variable,
contemporaneously correlated, and persistent.
This paper demonstrates the way in which such distinct hot and cold trading episodes can
arise given a stock-flow matching process. The paper characterizes the way in which these cycles
vary with trading conditions and then investigates the impact these fluctuating spells can have
on observed prices, sales and time to sale. The paper assesses this impact with comparisons to
observed measures in the residential property market in Madison, Wisconsin.
Stock-flow matching (see Taylor, 1995; Coles and Smith, 1998; Coles and Muthoo, 1998;
Lagos, 2000) assumes that buyers and sellers do not search randomly. Instead, market partici-
pants have a good idea about where to look for suitable partners. They check public and private
intermediaries such as real estate agencies and websites. Although these trading platforms pro-
vide information on a wide variety of opportunities, traders look for very specific characteristics.
Stock-flow buyers and sellers trade in precise, distinct markets, differentiated by location and
other features in which there are no trading frictions. In the housing market context, multi-
ple markets exist in a local geographic region. Within each small market, buyers look for a
combination of rooms, acreage, amenities and so on.
As buyers randomly come and go in each particular market, the populations fluctuate so
that traders can be on either the long or the short side of their precise market. If lucky, an
entrant is on the short side and finds one or more options immediately available. Trade occurs
straightaway. If the entrant is unlucky and on the long side, there are no potential partners
immediately at hand. In the event that no partners currently exist, the entrant becomes a part
of the stock or queue of traders on their side of the market and must wait to match from the
flow of new entrants on the other side.
The innovation introduced into the model here is to allow endogenous seller entry. To
maintain a well behaved market over time, the stock-flow literature typically assumes that
buyers and sellers independently enter the market one by one at the same exogenous Poisson
rate. In this paper, sellers have a higher arrival rate than buyers but they have the option to
decline the opportunity to enter the market and save the associated sunk cost of participation.
To illustrate, consider a housing market in which buyers bid for available homes in a public,
complete information auction. Suppose a potential house seller contemplating putting a home
on the market is “relaxed.” For example, some home owners have the option to wait and consider
moving later. If the seller knows that two or more bidders are willing to make offers, it will
pay the up-front cost of moving or building the house knowing that Bertrand bidding from the
buyers will result in the seller obtaining most of the gains to trade. On the other hand, with
one or zero bidders present, the seller will face a monopolistic buyer (either immediately or in
the future) who captures the majority of the gains to trade. Entry does not occur in this case
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as the seller does not recover its up-front costs.
Sellers know the number of bidders, to some extent, from the previous auction. If there
were N + 1 bidders in the last auction, there must be at least N for the next. As such, sellers
will enter until only one known bidder remains. The market then goes quiet and house sellers
forgo the opportunity to enter the market. As time passes, buyer entry will gradually replenish
the market. Assuming buyer entry is not revealed until the next auction is held, the market
remains dormant until sellers think enough time has passed to make it profitable to enter the
market. When the market re-activates, if new buyer entry did not occur, the lone bidder left
at the last auction pays a low price and the market becomes dormant yet again, even more so
as replenishing now requires not one but two new buyers. If buyer entry occurred, the bidders
offer high prices and entry remains active until the queue of buyers dwindles down again.
This pattern of trade is inefficient. When entry gets turned off with one bidder known to be
waiting, gains to trade are passed over. A bidder exists but prospective sellers do not respond. In
the housing market, a seller first pays a sunk entry cost - the up-front cost of moving, preparing,
or building the home. If entry were to occur, the monopolistic bidder would not compensate the
seller for this sunk cost. Due to this hold-up problem, the outcome during this dormant period
is therefore inefficient.
This pattern of trade (and its associated inefficiency) also varies with the cost of entry and
with the desire to own a home. The duration of cold spells increases and a buyer’s welfare during
these cold spells falls as entry costs rise. On the other hand, as home ownership becomes more
desired, cold spells shorten resulting in higher welfare when such cold spells occur.
Simulations reveal that the model can generate cold spells that substantially alter standard
measures of the housing market performance. With forgone entry lasting as long as three months,
the model performs well when viewed along side the housing market of Dane County, Wisconsin
home of the city of Madison. The model without these spells of withheld entry does not perform
nearly as well. The implications of hot and cold spells - persistence in price, variation in sales,
and correlation of price with sales - are prominent in simulations of the model. Simulated
outcomes also exhibit high variation in time on the market, correlation of time on the market
with price and correlation with price and lagged inventory. These outcomes are either much
smaller or not present in the model with fixed exogenous entry and hence without cold spells.
There is also a more direct link between the model and the data when the observations are
decomposed into finer segments. In Madison, small, distinct housing markets exhibit frequent
spells with zero sales and with a high number of sales. Models without explicit fluctuations are
inconsistent with this finding. On the other hand, simulations of this model with hot and cold
spells replicate this finding.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the literature which provides
context for the model and the results. The third section presents a baseline version of the
stock-flow matching model and specifies the nature of hot and cold trading spells. The following
section defines and establishes existence (as well as uniqueness) of an equilibrium, explores its
welfare properties, and reports comparative statics. Section 5 examines the implications of the
underlying trading assumptions. Section 6 then presents simulated market outcomes for an
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enhanced version of the model. These outcomes along with similar measures from the model
without an entry decision (and hence without hot and cold spells) are then compared with
observations from Dane County. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of the housing market based on stock-flow
matching. The stock-flow microstructure outlined above expands on random bilateral matching
and by construction incorporates competitive Bertrand bidding (i.e. auctions) from the long
side of the market. This paper demonstrates that if sellers in this framework exercise control
over their market entry, endogenous hot and cold cycles that increase market volatility emerge.
Thus, the paper contributes to the literature on the microstructure and trading dynamics of
housing markets as well as to the wider literature on search markets involving both auctions
and bargaining.
Dating at least as far back as Wheaton (1990), the application of search frictions to housing
markets addresses three broad empirical regularities.
 Housing cycles occur - there is short run positive serial correlation in prices but mean
reversion in the long run (Case and Shiller, 1989; Muelbauer and Murphy, 1997).
 There is excess volatility in prices and quantities relative to fundamentals (Shiller, 1982;
Glaeser et al, 2014).
 Price and sales exhibit positive correlation, while price and seller time-on-market (i.e.
liquidity) exhibit negative correlation (Stein, 1995; Krainer, 2001; Glaeser et al, 2014).
Han and Strange (2015) review recent search and matching models of the real estate market
and observe that while the basic pairwise random matching model can generate some of these
stylized facts in response to external shocks, it struggles to fully explain both persistence and
excess price volatility, even when the model allows for a variety of amplification mechanisms.
This paper addresses the above empirical regularities without appealing to external variation in
trading conditions and hence supplements potential rationales behind these dynamic observa-
tions.
Han and Strange also note that our understanding of the mechanics of housing auctions in
dynamic settings with search frictions - the approach adopted in this paper - is very limited.
Although bidding wars are common in practice, price determination in most matching models
with frictions derives from one-to-one bargaining. See also Arefeva (2017).
The contribution here addresses this methodological deficiency and allows the negotiated
price to account more fully for direct competition among buyers. Caplin and Leahy (2011) and
Arefeva (2017) take similar aim. This paper complements their contributions. Arefeva allows for
multiple buyers to match with and bid for a house in a given period and shows the importance of
possible bidding wars in amplifying the observed house price volatility.1 She demonstrates that
1Albrecht et al (2016) build a static auction model with directed search to study the role of the asking price
in the housing market.
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both the prevalent dynamic random and directed search models with bargained prices cannot
explain price volatility. Incorporating auctions substantially increases volatility. Arefeva’s anal-
ysis, however, concentrates on price volatility resulting from the propagation and amplification
of external shocks. This paper assumes constant gains to trade and focuses on endogenous boom
and bust cycles. It also broadens the empirical outlook by exploring not only price volatility
but also the other measures of variability outlined above.
Caplin and Leahy (2011) also use Bertrand competitive bidding across segmented housing
markets. Their structure shares several features with this paper, excludes exogenous sources of
price fluctuations, and considers the broader set of empirical regularities outlined above. Caplin
and Leahy, however, do not allow for a seller entry margin.2 As a result, trading cycles are
absent and their paper admits to “mixed success”in replicating the stylized facts. Fluctuations
in Caplin and Leahy are, for example, short lived. The entry decision appears critical which
is consistent with recent findings showing the supply side to be an important determinant of
volatility of house prices.3
Arefeva’s (2017) focus on amplifying shocks associated with the business cycle to address
excess volatility follows the approach found in much of the search and matching housing literature
on trading volatility and co-movements. These papers tie booms and busts in the housing market
to macroeconomic volatility. Krainer (2001) specifies aggregate demand shocks and demonstrates
a positive correlation in prices, sales and liquidity. House price volatility in Krainer (2001),
however, is lower than aggregate volatility - changes in liquidity (time to sell) respond as well
to aggregate shocks and absorb some of the market-wide variation. Novy-Marx (2009) obtains
amplification and generates excess volatility through an endogenous market tightness response to
aggregate demand shocks. Increased demand for houses (say from rising incomes) enables sellers
to trade faster. Fewer houses are thereby available next period which then leads to a further
price rise and amplification of the shock. A limited supply side response generates a market
tightness feedback mechanism that amplifies demand shocks while maintaining co-movement in
prices, sales and selling probabilities across steady states. Diaz and Jerez (2013) add aggregate
supply shocks to the Novy-Marx insight and quantify the feedback mechanisms. They find that
amplification and propagation are more pronounced in a competitive search environment than
under random search. Head et al (2014) likewise calibrate a directed search model to explore
the dynamics of house prices, sales, construction, and the entry of buyers in response to city-
specific income shocks. Their model, which incorporates Wheaton’s (1990) insight of the joint
buyer-seller problem, quantitatively accounts for a large share of house price variation driven
by income shocks and approximately half the serial correlation in house price growth. Ngai and
Sheedy (2015) likewise emphasize the importance of the moving decision - to simultaneously sell
the current house and buy a new one - in propagating and amplifying external shocks.
2Market history also differentiates the results. In Caplin and Leahy unsatisfied buyers (from the long side)
randomly reallocate each period whereas here buyers and sellers are tied to their market segment. See Section 6
for further comparisons.
3See Glaeser et al (2008) and Saiz (2010). Anenberg and Bayer (2013) along with Ngai and Sheedy (2015)
emphasize the importance of selling in the context of a joint buying and selling decision in housing search mod-
els. In contrast, Burnside et al (2016) and Landvoigt et al (2015) explore the importance of buyer entry for
understanding booms and busts.
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Anenberg and Bayer (2013) takes a different approach to the joint decision and, like Caplin
and Leahy (2011), is an exception to the amplification approach for explaining volatility. Anen-
berg and Bayer estimate a model in which the decision of homeowners to jointly sell their
existing house and buy a new one creates a coordination externality that leads to an alternative
explanation for endogenous booms and busts.4
Such analyses of endogenous cycles address the same empirical regularities that motivate the
external amplification approach but are not intended to suggest that a given mechanism is the
primary cause of any specific housing market cycle, including the boom and bust of the 2000’s
in the US. The objective instead is to identify the potential role of a mechanism in amplifying
volatility across housing booms and busts, regardless of their root cause.
3 Baseline Economy
Buyers and sellers populate a small, specialized, isolated market for an indivisible good - a house
or home - in continuous time. Buyers and sellers are risk neutral and discount at rate r > 0.
At the start of time the market is empty. As time proceeds, buyers looking for a home enter
the market at the constant, exogenous Poisson rate β > 0. Sellers each with one home for sale
obtain the option to enter the market at the exogenous Poisson rate σ > β. Both buyers and
sellers are drawn from countably infinite populations so that given the Poisson arrival processes
at most only one agent enters the market at a point in time.
Sellers can choose whether to take advantage of their entry opportunity or to decline entry.
For example, a home owner might contemplate trading but if the perceived current conditions
are unfavorable, their situation allows them to hold off and stay where they are. Potential
sellers thus receive the opportunity to participate in the market more frequently than buyers
but realized seller entry is endogenous.5
A buyer derives x units of discounted total lifetime utility from home ownership. For sellers,
the flow utility from ownership is normalized to zero. Moreover, sellers do not have the option
to wait or return at some other time. As a result, the payoff to a seller who decides to turn
down the trading opportunity and declines to participate in the market is zero.
A seller who receives an opportunity to trade and is considering whether to enter the market
knows the outcome of the previous auction, including the number of bidders and the date of
that auction. A potential new seller also knows whether there are any existing homes for sale,
that is if there are any unsatisfied prior sellers who entered the market but did not trade. This
seller, however, does not know the outcome of buyer entry over the period since the last auction
was held. Since buyers enter at Poisson rate β, sellers and buyers share the belief that the
4Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) also exhibits cyclical variation that complements the mechanism proposed here.
In contrast, the standard DMP model with free entry has a unique steady state with constant expected flow of
trade.
5The standard specification in the stock-flow literature is that buyer and seller entry are equal and exogenous
so that market balances over time. Persistent unequal entry would eventually lead towards an infinity of buyers
or sellers.
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Sellers who accept an opportunity to enter the market pay an up-front fixed cost of entry
F > 0 so the potential gains from trade between a potential seller and an existing buyer are
x−F > 0. If entry occurs, the seller immediately holds a full information, first price auction for
their good in a second stage of the entry period. The calling of an auction reveals to all agents
the total number of bidders before they submit their offers. All participants are revealed and all
buyers in the market are obliged to bid. As agents in the market are perfectly informed about
existing trading conditions, there are no impediments to trade after entry.
In the third and final stage at the entry date, sellers either accept a single bid or reject them
all. A sale therefore might not occur either because the seller rejected all bids or because there
are no bidders currently in the market. If an auction is held and a sale does not take place for
whatever reason at date t, the house remains active in the market. The seller is compelled to
hold another auction in the next instant at t+ dt for vanishing duration dt. A buyer who enters
when there are no other buyers present is thus aware of all available houses for sale. Multiple
auctions could take place simultaneously if sellers continuously rejected buyer bids or if sellers
choose to enter markets with existing sellers.
If a trade takes place, the consummating buyer and seller both permanently leave the market.
An accepted bid at price P yields a payoff x − P to the buyer and transfers revenue P to the
seller. Unsatisfied buyers and sellers remain behind to wait for the next trading opportunity.
Idle agents waiting for a possible trade receive and make no payments but do not leave the
market.
3.1 Market States and Transitions
In a closely related environment with exogenous (and equal) entry, Coles and Muthoo (1998)
establish that in any Markov perfect equilibrium, trade takes place immediately whenever gains
to trade exist. (See also Taylor, 1995.) To see this result, suppose that up to some point in
time all past entrants have exhausted all possible trading opportunities so that there are either
excess buyers or excess sellers but not both. Now suppose seller entry occurs when there is more
than one excess buyer. Without impediments to trade, buyers on the long side of the market
compete with each other and bid up to their reservation value at which point they are indifferent
between purchasing and waiting. If a trading surplus exists, the buyers’ bids exceed the seller’s
reservation payoff. The seller selects the highest bid, or more generally selects randomly among
the set of identical, highest bids from the indifferent buyers. On the other hand, let there be
excess sellers in the market and suppose a buyer enters the market. This buyer is on the short
side of the market and hence the lone buyer. As such the buyer will bid the reservation value of
the seller or sellers who are willing to accept the offer. The buyer then selects randomly among
the houses for sale.
Similar logic applies here. To keep the analysis tractable and focus on entry decisions, this
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paper imposes immediate trade. In particular, the paper adopts this stage game outcome when
a buyer or seller joins the market. The analysis then characterizes payoffs consistent with this
behaviour and establishes that delay is costly so traders would not want to deviate in equilibrium.
The paper does not consider more complex, history dependent trading strategies which may lead
to delayed trade in equilibrium. See Coles and Muthoo (1998) for a further discussion.
Assertion A1: Immediate trade occurs so that the market never simultaneously has unsatisfied
buyers and unsatisfied sellers.
Agents realize the gains to trade in the market without delay. Sellers formulate a reservation
price. At least one buyer’s bid exceeds this value in order to carry out trade. The seller accepts
the best bid so that in equilibrium sellers do not reject all offers.
In an immediate trade equilibrium with fully revealing auctions, the state of the market can
be summarized by an integer, N , denoting the known participants remaining from the last sale
and a duration D ≥ 0 denoting the time since the last seller entry and auction. In particular, if
over the course of market history up to the time of the last sale, a total of NB buyers and NS
sellers had entered, then
N = NB −NS
represents the number of known buyers (sellers) remaining after a sale for N > 0 (N < 0).
Given a vanishing interval length dt → 0 and buyer entry i ∈ N since the previous auction,
state transitions follow
Γ(N,D) = (N,D + dt) | NoSeller Entry
= (N
′
, 0) | Seller Entry (2)
= (N
′
, dt) | Seller Acceptance or Rejection
where N
′
= N + i − 1.6 If seller entry does not take place, the state, D in particular, evolves
incrementally with time whereas N remains unaltered as buyer entry i remains obscured. If
seller entry occurs, the duration is reset to D = 0 and N is updated before the bidding phase
to include not only revealed buyer entry i but also the seller’s own entry. After the auction
concludes, the duration measure moves along in step with time. As such, D = 0 indicates an
auction is taking place.
With no delays in trade, periods between observed sales result from waiting times between
seller entry when there are excess buyers, or between buyer arrivals if there are excess sellers.
When sellers turn down entry opportunities, these waiting times become prolonged. Let the
entry decision therefore define hot and cold states.
Definition: A state is hot or active when sellers accept the option to enter, and is cold or
dormant when potential sellers decide not to participate.
To identify hot and cold states, suppose that the transaction price falls as the number of
bidders declines so that the market becomes less profitable for sellers with fewer bidders. Since
6To keep the state moving along, rejection implicitly involves (re-)entry in the next instant from the same
seller.
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the number of bidders is known with certainty immediately following an auction, potential
sellers will decline entry (given a sufficiently high F ) for some period of time after an auction
that leaves the number of remaining buyers below a zero expected profit threshold which reflects
the competitiveness of bidding.
The distinction in market power between one and two bidders plausibly determines the
threshold state for entry. Monopolistic bidding allows the buyer to capture the trading surplus.7
If a monopolistic buyer can take advantage of the lack of competition and offers a bid (at or above
the reservation sale price but) below the sunk fixed entry cost, F , potential sellers will decline
the opportunity to participate immediately after auctions with zero or one bidder remaining. In
contrast, two or more Bertrand competitors are on the short side of their market thus market
power resides with the seller. Competitive bidding from two or more buyers, creates a different
scenario that can induce competing bidders to offer a profitable price.
The candidate outcome put forward is that sellers enter in any state with two or more
known available bidders but entry ceases for some period of time following an auction with one
remaining buyer who bids monopolistically not competitively.
Assertion A2: (Monopoly - Bertrand Partition) The market is hot for all states where N ≥ 2.
For N = 1 and D = dt the market is cold.
This assertion implies that the market becomes cold immediately following an auction with two
bidders. Although this specification eases the exposition, conditions on entry fee levels that
deliver this assumed threshold will be derived below.
To make entry profitable and revitalize seller entry so that cold states become hot, buyer
entry must replenish the pool of bidders. Immediately after an auction, the number of potential
bidders is known with certainty. As time proceeds, random buyer entry occurs. If no houses
are or become available, no auctions occur and potential sellers do not observe buyer entry. As
time proceeds without trade, the number of potential buyers grows stochastically. Expected
prices rise. For markets with zero or one known buyer, trade in the market eventually becomes
profitable, seller entry resumes and the market becomes hot. The selling process coupled with
Assertion A2 implies that cold markets transition to a hot market only from states with N ∈
{0, 1} after endogenous durations D = T1 and D = T0 respectively.
The transition from cold to hot states does not occur for N ≤ −1 so that in this benchmark
economy there is never more than one seller in the market at all dates. Consider the following
sequence of events. After a sufficient duration from the time of an auction with only one bidder,
suppose no buyers have entered and seller entry gets switched on. If a seller then enters before
a buyer, there are excess sellers (N = −1). The unsuccessful seller is the only agent currently
in the market so no sale takes place. As potential entrants observe an existing seller already
in the market and the absence of any sale with excess sellers, they will turn down entry until
the existing house is sold. Trade eventually takes place when a buyer arrives in which case the
market transits to N = 0 and D = dt. After such a sale, the market is empty with no houses
7The previous auction may have any non-negative number of left over bidders - zero, one, or more. If the
previous auction left zero bidders remaining, the next buyer to enter would obtain monopoly status, at least for
some period of time.
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for sale and no bidders wanting to buy. Thus, immediately after that trade, entrants continue
to decline trading opportunities until after a further duration T0. Hence, A2 implies the set of
hot states is given by
Ω = {(N ≥ 2, D ≥ 0) ∪ (N = 1, D ≥ T1) ∪ (N = 0, D ≥ T0)}.
All other states are cold.
3.2 Payoffs
In state (N ≥ 0, D = 0), an auction takes place with one house for sale and N + 1 buyers
bidding. For example, in the instant before the seller entered, suppose there were four buyers
known from the previous sale waiting for a home to arrive along with two new buyers unknown
to the seller, i = 2. The old state was N = 4. Entry revealed these six buyers and set the
duration to D = 0. At the auction stage of events, the just updated state N is defined as total
buyers less total sellers which is five including the one seller that just entered. After a successful
auction, the market will have N = 5 known buyers going forward as time proceeds.
Let P (N) > 0 denote the buyers’ symmetric price bids in this auction. Let seller rejection
of P (N) yield Z(N) whereas the seller’s payoff from acceptance is simply the price offered. Let
H(N) represent the payoff to a house buyer from being in a hot, active market with N ≥ 1
bidders (including the buyer) waiting for the arrival of a seller. As buyers are passive between
auctions, their bids and hence hot market payoffs are contingent on only the newly updated N
and not D which always equals zero in an auction. These bids and payoffs, however, account
for the expected actions of the other participants in the current stage as well as the expected
duration until and events in future auctions.
Let C(T ;N,D) represent the expected payoff to a buyer in a cold market who must wait
the remaining duration T > 0 before sellers with the option of entry become willing to pay F
to visit the market, i.e., before the market becomes hot again and the entry of sellers resumes.
In general, the expected payoff in a cold market is given by
C(T ;N,D) = e−rT
∞∑
i=0
πi(D + T )H(N + i)
where again πi(t) denotes the probability that i buyers entered the market after a duration t in
which case N + 1 bidders await an incoming seller. By Assertion A2, however, a market with
more than one known buyer N > 1 is active whereas buyers are absent (at least initially) for
N ≤ 0. The only relevant cold market payoff for characterizing trade therefore occurs at N = 1.
After a seller accepts a bid in an auction with two buyers, one buyer remains in the market
and the market becomes cold. The buyer who does not purchase the house receives expected
payoff C(T1;N = 1, D = 0) where T1 denotes the duration that this seller must wait after the
sale before seller entry resumes. For all D ≥ T1, the state (N = 1, D) is hot.8
8The duration of a cold spell depends on the number N of excess buyers remaining from the last trade or
seller entrance (if no trade occurred) hence the subscript notation with N = 1. From the buyers perspective, the
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Before entry occurs, the seller’s revenue is uncertain since unobserved buyer entry can occur
between trades. If N ≥ 1, a potential house seller knows a sale will occur immediately - there is
at least one buyer in the market - but not the transaction price. Following a spell of duration
D > 0 without seller entry, expected revenue less the entry fee for a seller contemplating entry




πi(D)P (N + i− 1)− F
If i ≥ 0 buyers arrived during D to replenish the market, the anticipated price P (N + i − 1)
accounts for both i revealed buyers and the seller’s own entry.
Without a known existing buyer, N = 0, there is the possibility of a seller not finding a
buyer in the market. If no buyers remain from the last auction and none have entered after
some duration D, an entering seller would have to wait for a buyer to enter. During this wait,
N = −1 and no other seller will enter. When a buyer does show, the state becomes (0, 0) and
the buyer bids a price P (0) that makes the existing seller indifferent between accepting and
rejecting. Given the rate of buyer entry, the discounted expected payoff to a seller alone in the
market (in effect rejection through no bidding) is
Z(−1) = 1
1 + rdt
[βdt P (0) + (1− βdt)Z(−1)]
so that
Z(−1) = βP (0)/(r + β). (3)
If one buyer arrived since the last auction, it is also a lone bidder again bidding P (0) but in this
case the transaction takes place immediately. Likewise for two or more bidders with the number
of bidders all coming from new buyers. Accounting for the probabilities of bidder numbers as
well as the impact of seller entry on the price, expected revenue less costs is given by
R(0, D) = π0(D)Z(−1) +
∞∑
i=1
πi(D)P (i− 1)− F
For N ≤ −1 as discussed above, sellers do not enter until the existing house sells - expected
revenue R(−1, D) to further seller entry is negative.
3.3 Price Offers and Seller Entry
To solve the auction stages recursively, note that the seller’s acceptance payoff is strictly in-
creasing in price. Hence, the seller’s best response strategy in an auction has the reservation
property. In state (N, 0), the seller accepts P (N) if and only if P (N) ≥ Z(N).
Now consider the bidding phase and suppose first that N = 1 and D ≥ T1, so that the
market has become hot after a cold spell. If a seller enters and no buyer entry had occurred
during the cold spell, N shifts and the ensuing auction proceeds with N = 0. With one bidder
market is hot if N ≥ 2 and non-existent for N ≤ 0 making C(T1) payoff relevant to the buyer.
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making an offer for the one house for sale, the well known Diamond result holds. The buyer
optimally bids the seller’s reservation price, P (0) = Z(0).9
With two or more bidders (N ≥ 1) price offers are derived from the hot and cold market
payoffs H(N) and C(T1) where to ease notation the understood state N = 1, D = 0 in C(T1)
is now dropped. Following Taylor (1995) for N ≥ 1, the buyers become indifferent between
paying P (N) and waiting for the next seller to enter, whether in a cold market for P (1) or in
hot market for P (N) with N ≥ 2.
These monopolistic and competitive bidding scenarios yield the following characterization of
prices offers.
Lemma 1: Price offers are given by :




P (1) = x− C(T1)
P (N) = x−H(N) N ≥ 2
Proof See Appendix.
Provided that sellers accept the buyers’ bids, i.e. P (N) ≥ Z(N) for all N ≥ 0, these prices
coupled with the cold state payoff C(T1) in turn determine bidder payoffs H(N) in a hot market.
For N = 1 and D > 0, the buyer is alone in the market waiting for the arrival of a seller who
will accept entry, a situation that arises after the transition from a cold period without buyer
entry. Two such transitions occur. One transition occurs after a duration D > T1 following
a two bidder auction during which no buyer entry occurred. The second occurs after duration
D > T0 that follows an auction with one bidder during which no buyer entry occurred.
Accounting for these transitions along with the entry rate of traders characterizes the buyer
payoffs in hot markets.
Lemma 2: The payoffs in the hot markets are given by
H(1) =
βH(2) + σ(x− P (0))
r + σ + β
H(2) =
σC(T1)
r + σ + β(1− η)
H(N) = ηN−2H(2) N ≥ 3
where
9The N = 0 price bid could be specified in a number ways with offer/counter-offer bargaining as a leading
alternative. The details will change but the basic mechanism does not hinge on the way in which agents divide




r + σ + β − [(r + σ + β)2 − 4σβ]1/2
2β
Proof See Appendix.
Note that H(N) is decreasing in N so that prices along with expected revenue R(N,D) decline
with the number of bidders as proposed above.
The derivation above of the monopolistic price P (0) = Z(0) implies that the seller accepts
this bid. To establish that the other P (N) bids also (weakly) exceed the seller’s option of
waiting, that is the reservation value for trade Z(N), assume that if another seller enters the
market, then this new seller immediately carries out its business and departs with a sale. The
existing first seller who delayed can then act.
The seller’s option of delay in this protocol is less than the offered price for all N ≥ 1 so
that the seller accepts a buyer’s bid P (N).
Lemma 3: In all states N ≥ 1, the seller’s payoff to waiting
Z(N) =
1
1 + r dt
[βdt P (N + 1) + σdt P (N − 1) + (1− βdt− σdt)P (N)]
exceeds the price offer P (N).
Proof See Appendix.
Now consider a potential seller contemplating the market in the entry phase. This seller’s
decision depends on whether the expected revenue R(N,D) outweighs the cost of entry. If the
expected revenue following seller entry is less than the up-front fee F , sellers decline entry. They
accept otherwise.
From the monopoly-Bertrand partition assertion A2, sellers accept entry opportunities and
markets are hot for all states in which N ≥ 2. Moreover, sellers decline entry and markets are
cold for N = −1. When N ∈ {0, 1}, sellers turn down entry over some period of time after a sale.
For N = 1 entry resumes after a period T1. Sellers turn down entry in states (N = 1, D < T1)
but the market becomes hot at (N = 1, D = T1) and remains hot for all D ≥ T1. For N = 0
and D = dt→ 0, T0 denotes the duration of the subsequent cold spell.
Expected net revenues or profit determine the corresponding durations T1 and T0. Suppose
first that there is one remaining buyer from the last auction, N = 1. If no new buyers have
entered since the previous auction (i = 0), seller entry decreases N and the lone buyer bids the
price P (0). With two bidders (one old and one new), the seller receives P (1) = x−C(T1) where
the unsuccessful buyer expects sellers to delay entry for the period of duration T1. With three or
more bidders (i ≥ 2), the price offered and paid is P (i) = x−H(i). Plugging in these outcomes
along with the Poisson probabilities πi(t), expected profit becomes






Entry occurs if and only if R(1, D) ≥ 0.
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When there are no buyers remaining from the last auction (N = 0), entry occurs if and only
if the corresponding cold spell duration T0 is sufficiently long so that R(0, D) ≥ 0. Plugging in
again for prices P (N) as well as for Z(−1) delivers the following result.
Lemma 4: For sellers aware of only one or zero known bidders, the critical cold spell duration
of delayed entry T1 and T0 respectively solve
R(1, T1) = e








[x−H(i)]− F = 0
and














[x−H(i)]− F = 0
The last step in this section is to verify that the monopoly-Bertrand partition in A2 is valid.
Given prices, payoffs and cold spells from Lemmas (1)-(4), sellers would enter monopolistic
(N ≤ 1) markets and the market would remain hot if discounted expected net revenue is positive
immediately following an auction that left one bidder remaining in the market:
R(1; dt) = P (0)− F = β
r + β
P (1)− F = β
r + β
[x− C(0)]− F > 0.
Conversely, markets with two known remaining bidders would become cold and entry would not
occur if the expected price did not cover fixed costs:
P (1) = x− C(T1) ≤ F.
The proposed monopoly-Bertrand auction distinction in Assertion A2 that delivers the threshold
requirement for entry therefore holds for
β
r + β
[x− C(0)] ≤ F ≤ x− C(T1) (4)
The left hand side inequality of (4) can be expressed parametrically.
Lemma 5: If and only if
F ≥ F c ≡ β[r(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β(1− η))]x




[x− C(0)] ≤ F
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Proof See Appendix.
The right hand side for entry with two bidders, F ≤ x − C(T1), contains an endogenous
payoff C(T1); however, the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix establishes the natural result
that buyers prefer a zero duration cold spell, that is C(T1) ≤ C(0). Therefore, a sufficient, lower
bound condition for the right hand side to hold is F ≤ (r + β)F c/β. An upper bound can also
be established. If F ≥ βx/(r + β), then the right hand side condition and hence A2 does not
hold.
4 Equilibrium
Definition: An immediate trade, monopoly-Bertrand partitioned, Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
with fully revealing auctions is set of state contingent
 rational expectations regarding buyer entry, πi(D)
 state transitions Γ(N,D)
 seller reservation price thresholds, Z(N)
 buyer price offers P (N)
 seller waiting durations T0 and T1 such that sellers accept the option to enter only in states
Ω = {(N ≥ 2, D > 0) ∪ (N = 1, D ≥ T1) ∪ (N = 0, D ≥ T0}
as specified in Lemmas (1)-(4) and satisfying equations (1), (2), and (3).
Proposition 1: If the conditions for (4) hold, then there exists a unique, immediate trade,
monopoly-Bertrand partitioned, Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Proof : See Appendix
In equilibrium with T0 > T1 > 0, the model exhibits a recurrent pattern of hot and cold spells
of trade. The mechanism underlying these hot and cold fluctuations is related to the cyclical
processes of conventional s− S models. Trade stochastically erodes hot housing markets with a
stock of buyers present. These hot markets will eventually turn cold once seller entry (which is
faster than buyer entry) runs down the stock of buyers and becomes no longer profitable. Unlike
conventional s−S models, the stock replenishes slowly as in Smith (2007). Entry resumes after
a sufficient time elapses for expected turnover to revitalize the market.
Although trade occurs immediately following entry, the existence of hot and cold spells is
inefficient due to a familiar hold up problem. With one buyer known to exist in the market
(N = 1), a social planner would want entry. There are unexploited gains to trade. Declined
entry by sellers during a T1 cold spell is therefore suboptimal and attributed to the inability of
sellers to recoup their sunk costs of entry.
When there are no known buyers in the market (N = 0), entry is again inefficient. If after
duration D, a new buyer has not yet entered (with probability π0(D)), then a seller who enters
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must wait. Since buyers arrive at rate β, the expected joint discounted payoff to trade in this







Plugging in and simplifying reveals that this payoff is non-negative if and only if
D ≥ TP0 =
− ln[ r+βr (1− F/x)]
β












Since firm payoffs do not account for the benefits obtained from the buyer in their entry decision,
firms again delay entry longer than is socially optimal when no one is in the market, i.e. N = 0.
The following result summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 2: Equilibrium is inefficient.
Equilibrium can be characterized further. The following comparative static result establishes
the way in which trading delays and cold market payoffs vary with key parameters.
Proposition 3: An increase in seller costs increases the cold spell duration T1 and decreases
the cold state buyer payoff C(T1). An increase in the utility of home ownership x decreases the
cold spell duration T1 and increases the cold state buyer payoff C(T1).
Proof: See Appendix
Given the stock-flow matching framework, these comparative static results are not surprising.
As the gains to trade rise, agents become more eager to exploit these gains. On the other
hand, they suggest that less valuable houses will exhibit greater fluctuations, a relationship
that can potentially help interpret the the market dynamics and co-movements explored in the
quantitative section below.
5 Discussion
In this paper, endogenous seller entry and stock-flow matching are critical for the existence of
hot and cold cycles. Stock-flow matching stochastically generates time between exchange as the
long side of the market waits for the arrival of traders on the short side. Allowing endogenous
entry generates further delays exacerbating the time between observed trades. On occasion,
some potential traders forgo the market which produces the cold trading spells.
So, how well suited is this particular matching framework for analyzing the housing market,
its volatility, and co-movements?10 The stock-flow microstructure is simple and plausible with
10Han and Strange (2015) claim that “there is a strong case for considering models with robust microfounda-
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empirical validity coming from labor market studies.11 This approach has featured prominently
in several recent papers on job and worker flows.12 In addition, the stock-flow microstructure
embeds several compelling features associated with the housing market. For example, in practice
sellers hope for auctions but an auction is not guaranteed. The seller does not choose between
an auction and a sequential decision process. The market decides. With stock-flow matching,
the distinction comes from the joint evolution and possible swapping of the long and the short
side positions in the market. Stock-flow matching thus provides not only a coherent setting for
the existence of competitive bidding but also integrates a mechanism for the market to generate
some houses being sold in bidding wars and others in a slower search-like fashion.13
Stock-flow matching also inherently involves thin markets in which a slowly evolving history
matters. Unlike the urn-ball matching set-up in Arefeva (2017) and in Caplin and Leahy (2011),
buyers and sellers in the stock-flow approach do not and cannot change circumstances rapidly
period to period. It takes a while for the long side to evolve. This feature seems plausible for the
housing market. Piazzesi et al (2017) find that buyers look in narrow market segments within
metropolitan areas. Han and Strange (2015) also note the relevance of thin markets in housing.
On the other hand, to deliver and characterize hot and cold spells, the model is explicitly
parsimonious. This simplicity highlights the critical components but abstracts from salient and
quantitatively important elements of housing markets, many of which might not fit easily in
with the stock-flow framework.14 Section 2 notes that business cycle fluctuations and the joint
buyer-seller decision are absent here. Moreover, some features of the parsimonious stock-flow
framework itself merit review.
As in conventional labor market search models (Pissarides, Chapter 1, 2000), the entry
decision is on only one side of the market, hence an asymmetry exists between endogenous seller
and exogenous buyer entry.15 To make this economy well behaved, sellers must appear more
often - hence the specification that σ > β. As σ becomes large, the specification approximates
the standard free entry condition. More generally, the underlying idea is that when excess buyers
are present, sellers arrive faster than buyers whereas when excess buyers are present, the reverse
tions.”They also state that “in many of these equilibrium models, a stationary framework has been the dominant
theoretical paradigm. However, a non-stationary equilibrium model would be particularly useful for assessing the
dynamics of the housing market, such as the overshooting phenomenon in the short run and the stickiness of
asking price.”
11Using employment spell data, Coles and Smith (1998) obtain compelling evidence in favor of this matching
behavior. See also Gregg and Petrongolo (2005), Shimer (2007), Coles and Petrongolo (2008), Kuo and Smith
(2009) and Andrews et al (2013).
12For example, see Ebrahamy and Shimer (2010) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013).
13Papers usually compare auctions with sequential search. For example, Wang (1993), Arnold and Lippman
(1995). See Arefeva (2017) footnote 9.
14For example, allowing for heterogeneity among buyers or sellers as found in many pairwise matching models
such as Arefeva (2017) would require keeping track of the number of every type of trader, a burdensome compu-
tation. Likewise, borrowing constraints and credit frictions do not arise (Stein 1995; Genesove and Mayer 1997;
Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2006; and Hedlund 2016). Real estate agents (e.g. see Hendel et al, 2009), construction
delays (see Davis and Heathcote, 2008; Gyourko and Saiz, 2006; and Head et al, 2014), rental housing markets
(Halket and di Custoza, 2015), idiosyncratic and potentially privately known house characteristics (Haurin, 1988),
increasing returns to matching (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014) are similarly omitted.
15Endogenizing buyer entry might be realistic and possibly feasible but it is unnecessary to illustrate cyclicality.
Endogenous buyer entry would complicate the model and raise a number of issues about renting and the link
between buying and selling a home simultaneously.
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occurs.
The baseline framework further specifies that sellers do not observe buyer entry, reflecting
in part that in real estate markets, sellers listing homes for sale tend to be serious whereas
buyers who view houses are serious only if they are prepared to make an acceptable offer. This
information structure can be attributed to the asymmetry in entry. The information revealed
about previously called auctions can be known to all incoming traders; however, sellers can act
upon what occurred in the market through entry, but buyers cannot. A seller calling an auction
reveals the as yet unobserved buyer entry in the economy. Price reveals the number of excess
bidders remaining. If a seller entered, initiated an auction and no transaction took place, all
traders can infer that an excess seller exists until a buyer arrives and engages in the auction
alone. Given the entry process, incoming buyers are unable to meaningfully respond to this
information.
On the other hand, the information structure does amplify the variability of the hot-cold
transitions. If sellers knew the number of buyers, the outcome would be more straightforward -
house sellers would never encounter a monopoly buyer. Two or more buyers would still attract
seller entry so that any built up stock of buyers would erode until one buyer remained. The
subsequent cold spell would then only last until a new buyer entered and became known thereby
restoring the entry threshold of two buyers. If seller entry were high (σ >> β) the stock of
buyers would become small and cyclical trading less pronounced.
Another trading assumption is that sellers who pass on an entry opportunity do not wait in
the market for conditions to improve. Potential sellers do not hang around. They look at recent
prices and decide if it is a good time to sell. If recent prices are high, they put their house on
the market or they begin construction. If prices are low, they turn their attention elsewhere.
If all sellers remained in the market, the stock of these sellers would build up unsustainably
over time. The lack of seller return approximates a situation in which households who wait for
more favorable conditions do not return for a substantial period during which the market will
have changed fundamentally and have little resemblance to current conditions.16 The long wait
might be linked with schooling, family, employment or other commitments.
Perhaps more fundamentally, there are no movements across markets. In practice, although
house sellers tend to be immobile across markets and might not differ substantially in how much
they like the sales price, buyers who find stiff competition for a particular type of house in a
confined neighborhood might expand their horizons. Likewise, in a narrow specific market as
envisioned here, not all buyers will like the same house.
Including these or other features could improve the performance of the model but would
complicate decision making and muddle the exposition. Moreover, it is not apparent how these
or other features would eliminate the basic logic for hot and cold spells proposed here. For
example, suppose buyers had idiosyncratic and heterogeneous house preferences that are unob-
served by the seller until bidding occurs. Provided recent prices for similar houses revealed some
information about the expected number of buyer types, sellers would formulate a threshold for
profitable entry leading to hot and cold spells.
16Under a more general specification with search costs, sellers could decide when to return as in Smith (2007).
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6 Quantitative Assessment
The stylized features of the model highlight its essential mechanics but limit its quantitative
performance. To boost the model’s empirical capabilities, this section introduces modest ex-
tensions that enable more fitting comparisons of the simulated model not only with the model
without endogenous entry (and hence without hot and cold spells) but also against familiar
and commonly considered housing statistics from a mid-sized local US housing market - Dane
County, Wisconsin. Dane County (pop 436,526 in 2000) is the home of the city of Madison
which contains approximately half the population of the county.
The objective is not to generate definitive empirical findings. Although the quantitative
model is enhanced, the exercise none the less leaves out prominent margins that can cause
hot and cold spells, provided they withstand these potential extensions, to become more or
less pronounced and thereby alter the alignment of the model with data. Given the abstract
framework, the simulations are designed as a demonstration that under viable parameterizations,
the model can deliver non-trivial hot and cold spells that not only are absent in standard settings
but also generate outcomes consistent with established and observed regularities in the data.
Extensions
In the model, the housing market is small and precise, a specification consistent with the
findings of Piazzesi et al (2017). In most statistics, however, a geographic area will typically
contain numerous such markets defined by neighborhood and housing type. As geographic
based statistics are broader than the model, the quantitative approach adopted here replicates
and aggregates the model across a number of small markets to match up against familiar housing
statistics at a local level.
These small markets are self-contained. Buyers and sellers only trade within their assigned
market. In each of these markets, however, two extensions are added. The appendix provides
details. The first extension introduces flow costs of being in the market. In the model above,
the cost of not trading is delay and hence determined by discounting at rate r. In everyday
practice, unmatched traders are likely to incur more substantial costs. Moreover, buyers are
likely to differ from sellers in these additional costs. To account for such differences, let buyers
and sellers now also have flow costs db and ds respectively while waiting in the market.
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Second, the enhanced model allows for some exogenous seller entry. To obtain (from time to
time) a non-neglible stock of unsold houses in the market (rather than sporadically having the
unrealistic limitation of at most one unsold house), let there be two potential types of sellers as
in Albrecht et al (2007). A portion of house sellers are now motivated (not relaxed) sellers who
(like buyers) do not have a choice about entering the market. Their particular circumstances
compel them to offer their home for sale. These entrants help shape the pattern of entry, the
duration of active and inactive spells, the volume of trade and prices paid. Moreover, as these
17When search costs are small, cold spells are essentially too short to accumulate enough potential buyers to
trigger the observed within month sales dispersion. Sellers, either motivated or relaxed, enter quickly after slow
periods so that large numbers of buyers for sustained high frequency sales volume rarely accumulate. Likewise,
cold spells are over and potential entry revived too quickly to create enough months without a sale. As a result,
the structure of the model leads to a high number of months with just one sale.
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motivated sellers list their homes for sale in markets without buyers, inventories of unsold homes
can build up. N can now be any negative as well as positive integer.
The other type of seller continues to be relaxed or discretionary. As above, these sellers have
the option to evaluate their prospects and decide whether to enter the market. In particular,
using the same notation, relaxed sellers receive the opportunity to participate in a given market
at the rate σ > 0. Motivated sellers enter at rate α ≥ 0. To keep the market well behaved, these
rates satisfy α < β and α+σ > β. Since motivated sellers are compelled to entered the market,
it is immaterial whether they pay the sunk entry cost F paid by relaxed sellers.
With both relaxed and motivated sellers in the market, the transition from a cold phase to a
hot phase can now come about in one of two ways. As before, the cold phase may conclude after
a sufficiently long period of (complete) market inactivity without any (motivated) seller entry.
Again, after some length of time, seller expectations of (unobserved) buyer entry eventually
improve enough to induce entry of relaxed sellers. In addition, during the cold phase, a motivated
seller might enter and trigger an auction. The outcome of this auction reveals the number of
buyers who have entered during the cold phase of the market and hence resets the entry decision
of potential relaxed sellers. If the auction reveals a sufficient number of remaining bidders
(N ≥ 2), entry of relaxed sellers becomes re-activated. If not, the waiting decision resets itself
to the beginning of the cold phase conditional on the number of bidders. If seller entry occurred
but no sale followed, the inventory of available homes builds up. In this case, the market remains
cold - no relaxed seller entry - until the stock of available homes is sold and then followed by an
appropriate cold period of duration T0 to replenish buyers.
Entry of motivated sellers occurs during both active and inactive markets. Relaxed sellers
will not enter markets with excess supply until all of the previous sellers who entered consummate
trades. They observe all unsatisfied trade and hence do not enter if another seller already exists
in the market. Motivated sellers, however, may enter to cause additional excess supply. Really
cold markets, those with excess sellers, remain cold until balance is restored. Even though
motivated sellers enter at a slower rate than buyers, from time to time the realization of the
entry processes will be such that more motivated sellers than buyers enter and cold markets will
experience having excess sellers. A non-negligible inventory of unsold homes can now build up.
Data
The South Central Wisconsin Multiple Listing Service (SCWMLS) provides monthly data
on average prices, sales, new listings and end of month inventory of unsold homes in Dane
County from January 1997 onwards. The SCWMLS also lists average time on the market for
unsold inventory until December 2002. To bypass the upheaval of the 2008 recession, the sample
considers these series until December 2007.
The picture emerging from the Dane County data is consistent with three findings emphasized
in the literature that suggest hot and cold spells in home sales. The three familiar findings from
Dane and elsewhere are that
 prices exhibit persistence
 sales are volatile
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 prices correlate with contemporaneous sales
These and selected other measures are given below. The appendix provides details.
In addition, the data underpinning the Dane County statistics can be used to produce ob-
servations more directly linked with hot and cold spells. Hendel et al (2009) and Ortalo-Magné
(2011) use the raw data generating the Dane County series for the period 1998-2005 to assess
the housing market in Madison. It is possible to inspect their data for January 1999-December
2005 for hot and cold spells and analyze the distribution of sales across precise markets in a
given month.
Houses in this data set belong to an assigned so-called quality class. In each elementary
school district, let a separate market exist for each quality class. Most of the observed homes sold
belong to five quality classes.18 There are 29 identifiable elementary school districts. Adopting
a quality class of home in an elementary school district approach as in Ortalo-Magné (2011),
there are potentially 145 good sized markets. Some elementary districts do not have home sales
with all five quality classes. Eliminating the quality class × elementary school markets with no
sales leaves 139 different sized markets.
A memoryless Poisson matching process for sales over time (which occurs in a standard
random search model such as the familiar Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework) would
not exhibit hot or cold spells but would generate a distribution of sales in which the mean
equals the variance. Table 1 therefore reports the average and maximum number of sales for
each month along with the standard deviation across markets. Unsurprisingly, June and July
are the busiest months and January and February the slowest.19 Although the size of these
markets varies across markets and with time, the high degree of variation in sales suggests hot
and cold spells exist. A more explicit test derives from a negative binomial regression which
nests the memoryless Poisson model. Given month, year, quality class and average market size
controls, the specification test rejects the Poisson specification (χ2 = 2617.02, Nobs = 11, 592,).
The Poisson specification is also rejected using a variety of more homogeneous subsamples.
Restricting attention to those markets within a quarter standard deviation of the median sales
and looking at sales for June and July, the test statistic is χ2 = 8.76, with Nobs = 476.
A simple graphic approach illustrates the same excessive variation. Using the same data,
the top panel in Figure 1 plots the distribution of sales in June and July for markets within a
quarter of a standard deviation of the median number of sales. A Poisson distribution with an
average of one and a half sales (which is roughly similar to the Madison average) is plotted in
the panel immediately below. This figure reveals an abundance of both no sales and of a high
number of sales in the data. Stated simply, there appears to be too much variation for a market
with random matching which does not experience hot and cold spells.
18There are nine quality classes in the Hendel et al (2009) data. The sample here drops the two highest - most
expensive - and two lowest - smallest units - quality classes which are also the smallest groups. A small percentage
of houses are classified in-between quality classes and also dropped from this analysis.
19Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) investigate this seasonality component.
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Table 1. Average Monthly Market Sales
Mean Standard Deviation Max
January 0.7184 1.3223 13
February 0.8643 1.6600 17
March 1.1925 2.2200 31
April 1.4679 2.4086 25
May 1.8467 2.9276 25
June 2.2050 3.4234 32
July 2.1398 3.1754 28
August 1.8085 2.7672 21
September 1.2598 1.9817 16
October 1.1801 1.9652 19
November 0.9834 1.6350 14
December 1.0424 1.7641 13
———————————————
Average 1.3924 2.4067 32
Source: Hendel et al (2009). Nobs = 966
In a tentative first step toward relating the comparative statics from the model to observables,
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of the quality class dummies from the negative binomial
regression for the Nobs = 476 restricted sample of markets with similar trading volumes. Al-
though the coefficient estimates are insignificant, they and hence the coefficient of variation for
sales of more desirable houses generally decreases. Cold spells interrupt active sales periods, so
that markets with less pronounced inactive cold spells will have more consistent and sustained
trading. The declining relative dispersion observed for more valuable homes thus appears con-
sistent with the shorter cold spells associated with higher gains to trade shown in the model, i.e.
with dT1/dx < 0. Table 2 also reports a rising R
2 from the hedonic price regressions (by quality
class) used in Hendell et al (2009). Again, there appears to be less unexplained variation in
prices for better houses which could be linked to shorter cold spells.
These connections, however, are preliminary. Among other limitations, the comparative
static relates to the gains to trade between the buyer and seller which can differ from the price
paid. None the less, when prices reflect the total gains to trade, a lower spread in sales and a
price more closely tied to fundamentals would at first glance seem consistent with shorter cold
spells causing less dispersion.
22
Table 2: Quality Class Sales Estimates and Hedonic Price Regression R2
Quality Class Coeficient Estimate (nbreg) Hedonic Price Regression R2
3 0 0.819 (1755)
4 -0.072 (0.138) 0.885 (5,234)
5 -0.183 (0.136) 0.887 (4,458)
6 -0.194 (0.127) 0.933 (3,293)
7 -0.039 (0.161) 0.910 (925)
Source: Hendel et al (2009). Coefficient standard errors and hedonic price regression Nobs in parentheses
Parameters
In the enhanced simulated model, let the daily arrival rate of buyers in each market be
β = 0.05
which implies a buyer in a particular market arrives on average once every 20 days. Over
a month, this rate (1.5) is marginally higher than the average (1.4) from Table 1 across the
averaged quality class × elementary school markets in Madison. Normalize the gains to trade
from buying a home so that x = 1. The sunk cost to a seller is set equal to half this value:
F = 0.5
The monthly rate of time preference is r = 0.0042 which corresponds to a 5% annual rate.
Potential sellers arrive at three times the buyer rate, α+σ = 3β. Let one in every five potential
sellers be (α) motivated or compelled to sell so that
α = β/4 = 0.03;
σ = 2β − α = 0.12
The latter specification is broadly consistent with Anenberg and Bayer (2013) who find that the
fraction of homes sold by movers within Los Angeles (movers who are more likely to be relaxed)
was 20% during trough sales periods and 40% during boom sales periods. Buyers search costs
are set to zero db = 0. For reasons discussed below, two values for seller costs are considered:
dLs = 0.000975
and
dHs = 1.5× dLs = 0.001462.
The eight parameters (α, β, σ, x, F, r, db, ds) describe a particular market. Using these pa-
rameters, the model for a given market can be solved numerically and then repeatedly simulated
over time to obtain familiar market-wide statistics. Given the house quality × school configu-
ration in Madison, let there be 150 identical, self-contained, small markets in which buyers and
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Figure 1: Monthly House Sales Frequency in Individual Markets
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sellers arrive according to independent continuous time Poisson processes. This figure roughly
matches aggregate sales.
In continuous time, Poisson arrival rates imply that the associated waiting times between
buyers and between potential sellers are both distributed exponentially so that more than one
trade does not take place at any one instant. The organization of simulated events, however,
reflects observed data in that events are recorded in discrete intervals during which more than
one sale can occur. In particular, the model is simulated for 240 intervals or discrete periods of
30 days each. The first 100 periods are dropped. Summing over the month and over individual
markets yields area-wide monthly average prices, total sales, new listings, inventory of unsold
homes and time on the market.
The parameters (or some subset) could in principle be estimated using minimum distance,
moment fitting methods. Such an approach poses practical difficulties. The threshold number
of traders will not always satisfy (A2). At some high seller costs for F or ds, profitable entry
for sellers requires N > 2 buyers. Adopting an endogenous threshold for when sellers enter
vastly expands the model and its computing complexity. Given this and other quantitative
limitations,20 the approach adopted here seems adequate for demonstrating that the model can
deliver non-trivial hot and cold spells that lead to outcomes broadly consistent with observed
regularities.
Simulations
Numerically solving for the endogenous variables for dLs = 0.000975 gives
TL1 = 39.6
TL0 = 67.6
C(TL1 ) = 0.499
Given lower seller search costs dLs , the duration of a cold spell with one known buyer in a market
is over a month plus a week. The duration of a cold spell when there are no known buyers is
two months plus a week. Given β = 0.05, the probability that no new buyers show up over
TL1 is approximately one seventh hence the likelihood that at least two (new plus old) buyers
are in the market after a TL1 spell is 0.8618. After a duration of T
L
0 , the probability that there
will be two (both new) or more buyers is nearly the same value 0.8508 whereas the probability
of at least one new buyer is close to one (0.9659). As a result, sellers with the option of entry
will infrequently find themselves without at least one buyer and therefore the inventory stock of
unsold homes derives primarily from motivated sellers entering cold markets.
20It is unclear how to weigh the relative importance of variation, correlation and persistence of potential variables
against each other, and against the distribution of markets without trade, the key to using Dane County data.
The lack of heterogeneity across buyers, the absence of spillovers across the many small markets and the other
abstractions in the model compound this challenge.
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Higher search costs for sellers, dHs = 0.001462, yield higher waiting times and lower payoffs
TH1 = 59.3
TH0 = 86.4
C(TH1 ) = 0.530
The higher seller search costs raise the respective waiting periods to approximately two and
three months.
As a first yardstick, both specifications with cold spells exhibit plausible levels of competition
among buyers. In the low cost dLs specification, the proportion of houses sold in competitive
auctions with two or more bidders is just below half - 0.494. In the high cost dLs , this figure
rises above one half to 0.530. Using data from the real estate brokerage firm Redfin, Arefeva
(2017) finds that between 2009 and 2016, on average half the buyer offers faced a competing bid.
Excluding the extremely low competition from 2009, this average becomes a bit further above
half and ranges from roughly 0.40 to 0.75.21
Table 3 presents further simulation results. The first column presents the SCWMLS bench-
mark Dane/Madison figures, logged, detrended and seasonally adjusted to facilitate comparison
with the stationary model.22 The following three columns present statistics from different speci-
fications of the model. To benchmark outcomes without hot and cold spells, the first shuts down
the seller entry decision. This specification is not only closely related to Caplin and Leahy (2011)
(as noted in Section 2) but also corresponds to Coles and Muthoo (1998) and other stock-flow
matching models in which there are no relaxed sellers, i.e. σ = 0. To maintain a well behaved
economy in this specification requires equal entry rates for buyers and motivated sellers so that
α = β = 0.05. The next two specifications have discretionary (relaxed) seller entry - hence
hot and cold cycles. These two correspond to the model with endogenous entry under the two
different values of seller search costs, dLs < d
H
s . (The appendix provides other statistics and
discussion for the dLs case.)
The assessment of these results proceeds in three steps. The first step groups and considers
together the aggregated market-wide variation, correlation and persistence in the sales-price
measures highlighted above that suggest the presence of hot and cold trading. In particular, the
top three rows of Table 3 present the standard deviation over time in total sales, the contem-
poraneous correlation of these sales with average prices and the one month autocorrelation of
average price.23
The second stage of the assessment focuses on the unique strength of these data - the un-
derlying direct evidence of cold spells during which no sales occur. The fourth row in Table
21No data on the number of offers are available for the SCWMLS data. For the exogenous seller entry simula-
tions, this figure is time dependent. The distribution of a Poisson minus a Poisson is a Bessel distribution centered
about zero that spreads out symmetrically over time. Thus, the proportion of competitive bids is necessarily less
than one half, starts small, but limits to one half after sufficient time passes.
22OLS regressions with a linear trend and monthly dummies are used to detrend and seasonally adjust all logged
variables. The general picture of relative standard deviations is similar but less pronounced when the variables
are not detrended and seasonally adjusted.
23Price variation is not assessed. The model finds the share of the gains from trade whereas the price itself
reflects the value of the asset to the buyer. These are different concepts.
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3 therefore reports the ratio p0/p1 of zero house sales to one house sale recorded in a month,
averaged over time and across all individual markets.24 The bottom three panels of Figure 1
complement this statistic by plotting the distribution of sales across markets from the three
simulated models.
The third step in this analysis turns to other statistical relationships often put forward in the
housing literature. The duration of search, i.e. liquidity, is one often used measure. To gauge
this measure, rows five through seven in Table 3 report the mean, standard deviation, and co-
movement (with price) for time on the market (ToM). As discussed in Caplin and Leahy (2011),
in the housing and job markets, another key statistic is the availability of trade. Therefore, the
last row in Table 3 reports the correlation of price with lagged inventory (Inv). Inventories arise
when motivated sellers enter a cold market, do not find an available buyer, and then wait for
buyers. Time on the market as well as inventories are thus proxy measures for the extent of cold
markets.
Hot markets have excess buyers bidding high prices for rapidly sold houses. In contrast, cold
markets exhibit slower seller entry along with monopoly buyers making low bids potentially
to an inventory of unsold houses that are lingering about. As a result, in markets with more
prolonged cold spells, prices and sales will become more variable and more positively correlated
with each other. Moreover, as cold spells last longer, prices and sales stay lower for longer
thereby raising price persistence as well as diminishing observed liquidity. Table 3 reveals these
relationships and more significantly that they fit better with observations from the SCWMLS
data.
Based on the first three measures of variation, co-movement and persistence in Table 3, the
model without hot and cold spells performs poorly. This specification has the least variation in
sales. It also displays a low correlation of price with sales, and no autocorrelation in price.25
The two specifications with hot and cold spells both improve upon these measures. In both
versions with discretionary seller entry, the standard deviation in sales rises and becomes closer
to the SCWMLS observation. The co-movement of prices with sales and price persistence are
likewise more pronounced and more in line with observed outcomes. Although the simulated
price-sales correlation with hot and cold spells is higher than that observed in Dane County,
the Dane County measure is less than found elsewhere from more aggregated, longer but less
frequent, and sometimes trending series.26.
Turning to the direct measures of cold spells, the simulated p0/p1 ratio without entry is
approximately the figure that would obtain given random matching. As discussed above, random
matching does not perform well in this regard. Relative to the SCWMLS data, there are not
only too few large sale months but also too few months with zero sales. In contrast, the p0/p1
ratio improves in both models with entry. Both specifications exhibit a higher p0/p1 ratio. This
ratio in the high cost dHs specification nearly equals the value observed in the SCWMLS data.
24For the SCWMLS, the ratio p0/p1 statistics comes from using the sample of markets with similar numbers of
sales. As in the negative binomial regression, the sample uses only June and July sales and includes only those
markets with June and July sales within a quarter of median sales. Again, for this sample Nobs = 476.
25These latter statistics are unstable. They vary considerably across simulation runs.
26See Stein (1995), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), Dı́az and Jerez (2013) and Ngai and Sheedy (2015). An
exception is Head et al (2014) with a negative price-sales relationship.
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The bottom three panels of Figure 1 further support this finding. The frequencies of zero sales
and of a high number of sales increases with hot and cold spells. In addition, it is also possible
to calculate the number of months in which a seller actually refuses entry, either with one or
zero known buyers. Given dLs , the proportion of months×markets that experience at least one
relaxed seller declining entry during a T1 cold spell is 0.353. The proportion for T0 spells is
0.4333.
Table 3. SCWMLS Data and Model Simulations
SCWMLS Exogenous Hot Cold Spells
Data Entry dLs d
H
s
SD (Sales) 0.114 0.068 0.074 0.075
Corr(Sales,Price) 0.219 0.113 0.237 0.384
AutoCorr(Price) 0.332 -0.004 0.399 0.377
p0/p1 1.014 0.668 0.767 0.983
Mean(ToM) 66 36.8 32.2 29.6
SD(ToM) 0.081 0.103 0.245 0.244
Corr(Price,ToM) -0.085 -0.316 -0.385 -0.403
Corr(Price,lag(Inv)) -0.111 0.256 -0.341 -0.271
The set of measures in the last four rows of Table 3 continue painting a similar picture. All
three simulated models have an average duration on the market of a month or so which accounts
for roughly half the time observed to complete a trade. There are, of course, several factors that
will also contribute to these trading delays. The variation in time on the market is higher in
the simulated data than in the limited SCWMLS data. Although this excess dispersion is more
pronounced with hot and cold spells, the SCWMLS measure is lower than in other studies. Dı́az
and Jerez (2013) find that the time on the market variation is nearly twice the sales variation.
Ngai and Sheedy (2015) find that time to sale - a different but related measure - is twice the
price variation.
The housing literature often explores the link between price and time on market. Here the
model differs from the SCWMLS data. In all three versions of the model, the correlation is
negative and prominent. The correlation is weakly negative in Dane County data. Time on the
market in the SCWMLS is calculated over a relatively short time period. Moreover, the absence
of this co-movement in the SCWMLS data is out of line with the relationship obtained elsewhere.
Several authors document and emphasize a robust negative relationship between price and time
on the market or with time to sell linked with hot and cold markets.27 The pronounced inverse
relationship in the simulations conforms with evidence of a strong inverse relationship perceived
as stylized fact. See Ngai and Sheedy (2015), Dı́az and Jerez (2013), Krainer (2008), Novy-Marx
(2009).
27Average time on the market, which measures the average duration a home in the unsold stock available has
been on the market, differs from the average time to sell, which measures how long a house took to sell among
the flow of houses leaving the market.
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The simulations with hot and cold spells also yield the negative price-lagged inventory rela-
tionship highlighted by Caplin and Leahy (2011).28 This relationship is positive when relaxed
sellers can choose whether to enter. With this entry decision available, the correlation exceeds
the measure found in Dane County. Indeed, the simulations with entry generally exhibit stronger
correlations than observed in Dane County which may in part reflect the impact of detrending
and seasonally adjusting the SCWMLS data.
Although the dHs specification performs best in several dimensions, an underlying difficulty
highlights the quantitative limitation of using the stylized model. Under these parameters, the
imposed and fairly natural threshold between one and two bidders does not hold. The price in a
two bidder sale is less than the entry fee, P (1) > F, which violates (A2). Although the violation
is modest (0.03), it implies that sellers would not obtain a profit from two buyers. Sellers want
to wait even further for additional buyers (Caplin and Leahy (2011) explore this possibility), an
outcome that would intuitively appear to induce even more dispersion in sales. None the less,
this specification suggests that sufficiently lengthy cold spells can be found that begin to line up
with the dispersion in sales with observation.
Improving the empirical content requires an extensive expansion of the model and a more so-
phisticated empirical approach. On the other hand, the increasing availability of high frequency
trading data could spur further interest in the empirical performance of this framework. For
example, REDFIN allows downloading data for a large number of MSAs in the United States
from 2009 onwards. One can readily observe differences across time and place. It is intriguing
to consider what parameter differences could account for the variation.
Table 4 offers a more modest investigation - a brief robustness/comparative static exercise.
Using the lower seller search cost specification dLs , Table 4 presents simulated outcomes for
different values of two other cost parameters. In particular, the fixed entry cost for the seller is
lowered to F = 0.4, down from F = 0.5. In addition, as the interest rate r contributes to both
buyer and seller impatience and hence eagerness to trade (along side ds), the table presents the
key figures simulated for a lower, the same, and a higher interest rate.
The middle column of Table 4 corresponds to the initial interest rate specified in Table 3.
(The adjacent figures in parentheses in this column are the figures from Table 3, i.e. from the
model with higher fixed entry costs for the sellers.) Lowering entry costs F by twenty percent
decreases the T1 induced cold spell by almost two weeks which is nearly a third of the original
spell. The decline in the T0 induced cold spell is approximately the same number of days which
is slightly less than twenty percent of the original value so that this elasticity is just less than
one.
The impact of lower entry cost and the accompanying shorter cold spells on market ob-
servations is to marginally lower sales dispersion while more notably raising the correlation of
sales with price and the autocorrelation of prices. These last two two figures thus become more
distant from the SCWMLS data. The p0/p1 ratio likewise moves substantially away from its
data target. The mean and standard deviation of time on the market rise, the correlation of
28In their baseline model which shares aspects of this model but does not have hot and cold spells, Caplin and
Leahy are unable to explain positive autocorrelation in prices or a negative correlation between price and lagged
inventory.
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price with the time on market becomes less negative whereas the correlation of price with lagged
inventory rises. While these last four are a mixed bag of outcomes compared the SCWMLS data,
recall that these data are somewhat limited and not entirely consistent with other data sources.
Note as well that the proportion of competitively sold houses (with two or more bidders) falls
further from the observations from Arefeva (2017).
Reading from left to right across Table 4, a rising interest rate lowers the buyer’s expected
payoff in the cold spell. Lower buyer payoffs are accompanied by shorter spells before sellers
become willing to enter which in turn change the observable data measures without much sur-
prise. As the cold spells become shorter, the variation in sales, the co-movements of price with
sales and of price with lagged inventories, and the autocorrelation of prices all become smaller.
The proportion of sales with two or more bidders also falls. Exceptions come from outcomes
involving time on the market. The mean time on the market rises with the interest rate but its
variation and co-movement with price exhibit inverted U-shaped patterns as the interest rate
increases. It is also worth noting that the figures from the low interest cost coupled with lower
entry costs are similar in several cases to the baseline model figures.
Table 4. Model Simulations for Lower Entry Cost (F=0.4)
r = 0.04/12 r = 0.05/12 (F = 0.5) r = 0.06/12 (F = 0.5)
C(T1) 0.600 0.576 (0.499) 0.562 (0.482)
T1 40.1 27.5 (39.6) 21.7 (30.7)
T0 68.4 55.0 (67.6) 48.4 (58.2)
SD (Sales) 0.074 0.070 (0.074) 0.069 (0.69)
Corr(Sales,Price) 0.360 0.284 (0.237) 0.226 (0.221)
AutoCorr(Price) 0.4463 0.441 (0.399) 0.379 (0.350)
p0/p1 0.794 0.597 (0.767) 0.564 (0.638)
Mean(ToM) 33.0 38.4 (32.2) 39.5 (36.6)
SD(ToM) 0.244 0.259 (0.245) 0.228 (0.245)
Corr(Price,ToM) −0.331 −0.259 (−0.385) −0.348 (−0.378)
Corr(Price,lag(Inv) −0.398 −0.394 (−0.341) −0.347 (−0.365)
Pr(Bidders≥ 2)) 0.494 0.456 (0.494) 0.430 (0.476)
Note: Figures in parentheses are simulated results for F = 0.5
7 Conclusion
Profit attracts entry. In perfectly competitive markets with full information, instantaneous
erosion of profit pins down the timing and number of entrants as well as the price and quantity
sold. In markets with frictions, entry and the subsequent pattern of trade may not be as
immediate nor as straightforward. Depending on market structure, it may take time to uncover
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profitable opportunities which in turn affects the ability and willingness of agents to exchange
goods and services.
This paper investigates the way in which entry of this sort affects housing markets with stock-
flow matching. Home buyers compete in complete information auctions for homes brought to
market one by one. To attract home seller entry, there must be sufficient competition among
these bidders. Bertrand-like offers from two bidders are sufficient to induce entry. One monop-
olistic buyer is not.
Given that house sellers can enter more rapidly than home buyers, markets will alternate
between periods of active and inactive entry. In cold markets, prospective sellers pass up pro-
duction opportunities as they wait for the (unobserved) arrival of buyers to replenish the market.
Once they think enough time has passed, entry resumes and reveals the profits to be made in
the market. Seller entry continues until it exhausts the existing demand.
The periods of inactivity are inefficient. With one willing but monopolistic bidder, gains to
trade exist but are passed over because sellers do not obtain a sufficient share of this payoff. In
particular, sellers will want to cover an up-front sunk cost which a monopolistic bidder cannot
commit to paying before entry takes place. With Bertrand numbers, buyers are compelled to
bid above the sunk cost making entry profitable.
Simulated outcomes align with empirical evidence from Dane County, Wisconsin as well as
stylized facts established in the literature. The simulated variation in sales, the correlation
of price with sales and the persistence in price improve as hot and cold spells become more
pronounced. Likewise, hot and cold spells improve the fit of correlations of price with time
on the market and with inventory. Perhaps more fundamentally, the simulated outcomes are
consistent with the high frequency of periods of inactivity in precisely defined areas.
To conclude this picture, it is worth looking again at the underlying data for Madison and
considering stock-flow generally. Ortalo-Magné (2011) looks in detail at a particular homoge-
neous market in Madison - large houses in a single elementary school district - which conforms
closely to the specification of a single market in this paper. Figure 2 reproduces Ortalo-Magné’s
observations of price premia29 and the number of available houses on the market during the pe-
riod January 1999 until December 2004. Viewed through the lens of stock-flow trade, this plot
is intriguing. Two episodes stand out given the focus on hot and cold spells. Between December
2000 and December 2001, the Ortalo-Magné figure displays only two price premia (hence sales)
both of which occur shortly after the addition of a new home for sale, one after a month and
the other after two months. It looks as if a seller entered a cold market and was able to sell
to an eager buyer. In the eight months between July 2001 and March 2002, no sales appear to
take place. In the second episode from September 2003 until January 2005, again only two price
premia appear. Within this period, no sales take place in the ten months between September
2003 and June 2004 during which time two house were added to the inventory for sale. It looks
as if in this instance sellers entered during a dry patch in turnover but did not find a buyer
willing to trade quickly.
29The price premium is the ratio of the transaction price to a hedonic regression adjusted price minus one.
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Figure 2: Price and Monthly Sales in a Single Market
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P (0): When there is only one bidder at entry, cold market behaviour implies that seller but not
buyer entry ceases until this particular transaction occurs. To find a seller’s reservation threshold
in this situation note that the bidder offers the price P (0) that makes the lone seller indifferent
between accepting now and waiting for another bidder to arrive and bid P (1). Accounting for
the potential state change from buyer entry, the equilibrium bid that makes the seller indifferent
can be written as
P (0) = Z(0) =
1
1 + rdt





P (N), N ≥ 1: In a full information Bertrand pricing game with more than one bidder, buyers
bid up prices until the buyer’s gain to trade from purchasing the currently available good equals
the payoff of staying in the market and waiting for the next auction. In particular, the buyer’s




I[P > P−1](x− P − C(T1)) + I[P = P−1]
(














where the other buyers offer at least the seller’s reservation wage in this auction, P−N ≥ Z(N).
The best response strategy P (N) is to offer just above P−N until P (N) reaches the buyer’s
reservation threshold. At this offer limit, the buyer is indifferent between buying the house and
waiting. QED
Lemma 2
H(1): A lone bidder receives x − P (0) if seller entry occurs and H(2) if buyer entry occurs.




[σdt (x− P (0)) + βdtH(2) + (1− σdt− βdt)H(1)] .
H(2): With one other waiting bidder, seller entry results in an auction that leaves one known,
unsatisfied bidder remaining for the next auction. This outcome stops the entry of sellers and
leaves the unsatisfied bidder in a cold market with expected payoff C(T1). The successful bid
with two bidders leaves them indifferent between buying and remaining, x − P (1) = C(T1).
Alternatively, buyer entry yields H(3), hence the payoff to a buyer in an active market with two
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[σdtC(T1) + βdtH(3) + (1− σdt− βdt)H(2)]
H(N), N ≥ 3: Competitive bidding here makes buyers indifferent between purchasing and
waiting in a hot market for the next auction with one less competitor. Hence, seller entry yields




[σdtH(N − 1) + βdtH(N + 1) + (1− σdt− βdt)H(N)]
Applying the quadratic formula, this linear second order difference equation has stable root η.
Plugging in the solution for H(3) yields H(2). Substituting for H(2) in H(1) gives the payoff
to a lone monopolistic buyer in an active market. QED
Lemma 3
In state N ≥ 1, rejection followed by accepting the price offered in the next instant yields
Z(N) =
1
1 + r dt
[βdt P (N + 1) + σdt P (N − 1) + (1− βdt− σdt)P (N)]
The payoff for the first seller to a one period delay followed by accepting the price offered next
period is given by
Z(N) =
1
1 + r dt












−H(N) < x−H(N) = P (N)
Similar calculations hold for delays by sellers of two periods or more which completes the proof.
Note as well that Z(N) = P (N) as dt→ 0. QED
Lemma 5
The last step in the proof of Proposition 1 also establishes this result.
Proposition 1:
Plugging in the formulas for H(N) and the monopoly price
P (0) = βP (1)/(r + β) = β[x− C(T1)]/(r + β)
into the cold market payoff formula yields a first expression in two unknowns - T1 and C(T1) :
Λ∗(T1)C(T1) =
rσ







(r + β)(r + σ + β))
− βσ
(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η))
− σ(e
βηT − 1)
















r(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β)(r + β(1− η))
(r + β)(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η))
> 0
C(T1) in (5) is a strictly positive, downward sloping function of T1 with strictly positive intercept
C(0) =
rσ(r + σ + β(1− η))
r(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β)(r + β(1− η))
x > 0
Next plugging in price P (0) and H(N) into the R(1, T1) revenue equation in Lemma 4 gives















η(r + σ + β(1− η))
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σ(eβηT1 − 1)
















r + σ + β(1− η)
> 0
Differentiation of (6) with respect to C(T1) gives e
−βT1Λ∗∗(T1) > 0. Differentiation with respect
to T1 yields






























−β(x− F ) + e−βT1Λ′∗∗(T1)C(T1) < −β[(x− F )− C(T1)]
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Hence, in (6) C
′
(T1) > 0 for (x− F )/C(T1) > 1. Moreover, as
Λ∗∗(0) = r/(r + β) > 0
the C(T1) intercept from (6) is
C(0) = x− (r + β)F/r




Thus, if the C(0) intercept from (5) is less than the intercept from (6), i.e.
F ≤ β[r(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β(1− η))]x
r(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β)(r + β(1− η))
then these two equations intersect exactly once with C(T1) > 0 and T1 > 0. QED
Proposition 3






































The proof of Proposition 1 established the noted signs for the individual elements in matrix Q.
As det[Q] < 0, it immediately follows that dC(T1)/dx > 0, dC(T1)/dF < 0, and dT/dF > 0. To
























(r + β)eβT1Λ∗(T1)− rΛ∗(T1)−
rσ





r + σ + β
− βσ
(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η))
=
r(r + σ + β(1− η)) + β(r + β(1− η))







(r + β)eβT1Λ∗(T1)− rΛ∗(T1)−
rσ
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(r + β)eβT1Λ∗(T1)− rΛ∗(T1)−
rσ
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Λ′∗∗(T1)
Note that







r + σ + β
Λ′∗∗(T1) = β(r + β)e
βT1S∗(T1)−
rβσ





r + σ + β
− βσ
(r + σ + β)(r + σ + β(1− η))
− σ




βT1 − 1− σ
η(r + σ + β(1− η))
(eβηT1 − 1)
























S∗(T1) > 0 and S∗∗(T1) > 0 imply that
β(r + β)eβT1Λ∗(T1)−
rσ
r + σ + β
Λ′∗∗(T1) > 0
thereby establishing dT1/dx < 0. QED
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Motivated sellers and search costs
With direct search costs (db , ds) and two types of sellers, price determination follows the
same mechanics based on the payoffs during hot and cold spells. The payoffs to buyers and
sellers, however, are more involved. In addition, the state of the market given by (N,D), can
have any number of sellers on the short side and is no longer bounded below by −1.
Buyer payoffs








[(α+ σ)dtC(T1) + βdtH(3) + (1− (α+ σ + β)dt)H(2)− dbdt]




[(α+ σ)dtH(N − 1)+
βdtH(N + 1) + (1− (α+ σ + β)dt)H(N)− dbdt]
The solution to these difference equations is given by
H(N) = ηN−2 − db/r
H(2) =
(α+ σ)C(T1)− (r + β)db/r
r + α+ σ + β(1− η)
H(1) =
βH(2) + (α+ σ)(x− P (0))− db
r + α+ σ + β
where
η =
r + α+ σ + β − [(r + α+ σ + β)2 − 4(α+ σ)β]1/2
2β
< 1
The payoff to waiting is more involved. With probability αe−αtdt, a motivated seller enters
the market during the cold period after a duration t and triggers an auction with the existing
bidders and any other buyers who might have entered during the cold period up to time t. In


















Ψ1 = A1 +A2
Ψ2 = (η −D4)A3 +D4A4 −D4A5 +A6
Ψ3 = D5A3 −D5A4 +D5A5 −A7 −A8
A1 =
α(1− e−(r+α+β)T1)




αβ[1− e−(r+α+β)T1(1 + (r + α+ β)T1)]
η(r + α+ β)2
A4 =
α(1− e−(r+α+β(1−η))T1)
η2(r + α+ β(1− η))
A5 =
α(1− e−(r+α+β)T1)
















r + α+ σ + β
D2 =
β
r + α+ σ + β
D3 =
1
r + α+ σ + β
D4 =
α+ σ
r + α+ σ + β(1− η)
D5 =
r + β
r + α+ σ + β(1− η)
Like buyers in markets with excess bidders, sellers in markets with excess goods accept bids
that make them indifferent between taking the bid and waiting for the next auction. Since α
governs the arrival rate of motivated sellers, the payoff to a lone seller in the market (N = −1)
awaiting for the arrival of buyer is given by
Z(−1) = 1
1 + rdt
[αdtZ(−2) + βdt P (0) + (1− αdt− βdt)Z(−1)− dsdt]
With other sellers waiting the arrival of a buyer (N ≤ −2), sellers are willing to accept a bid






[αdtZ(N − 1) + βdtZ(N + 1) + (1− αdt− βdt)Z(N)− dsdt]
The solution to these difference equations is given by
Z(−1) = βP (0)− (r + α)ds/r
r + α+ β − αλ
and for N ≤ −2
Z(N) = Z(1)λ−N−1 − ds/r
where
λ =
r + α+ β − [(r + α+ β)2 − 4αβ]1/2
2α
From time to time, entry from one side or the other of the market will occur such that the
auction has one bidder and one seller. In this auction, the buyer’s offer again makes the seller
indifferent between waiting and accepting. For N ≤ −2
P (N) = Z(N)
Given that buyer entry or seller entry will shift the market, the equilibrium bid with one buyer




[αdtZ(−1) + βdt (x− C(T1)) + (1− αdt− βdt)P (0)− dsdt]
Substitution for Z(−1) gives
P (0) =
βD6[x− C(T1)]− [rD6 + α(r + α)]ds/r
D6(r + α+ β)− αβ
where
D6 = r + α+ β − αλ
Solving yields
P (0) =





(r + α+ β)D6 − αβ
B2 =
rD6 + α(r + α)
r[(r + α+ β)D6 − αβ]
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πi(T1)P (i+ 1)− F
whereas






This section documents familiar housing market statistics from the Dane County SCWMLS,
broadening the reporting on price, sales and time on the market by including new listings and
inventories. The same measures are documented from the simulated model and then viewed
alongside the Dane County data. The discussion here concentrates on relationships not assessed
in the body of the paper.
Table 5 presents the mean values of five SCWMLS variables (in levels) along with their
minimum and maximum values. It is worth noting that sales are two thirds the size of listings
and less than a quarter of inventory. Table 5 also presents the standard deviation of their logged,
detrended and seasonally adjusted values. Note that time on the market is derived from far fewer
observations.
Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations
Dane County SCWMLS Data | Model
Mean Min Max SD N | SD
Price 209,258 116,674 292,462 0.047 132 | 0.034
Sales 423 157 792 0.114 132 | 0.074
Listings 636 238 1241 0.119 132 | 0.075
Inventory 1847 1228 3118 0.241 132 | 0.148
Time on market 66 42 98 0.081 72 | 0.245
Notes: SCWMLS data in italics. Simulated data in bold face
The lower diagonal half of Table 6 reports the observed contemporaneous correlations among
these logged, detrended and seasonally adjusted variables. From the lower half of Table 6, price
exhibits positive correlation with listings as with sales. The correlation of price with inventory
is negative. Sales and inventory are inversely related whereas listings and inventory correlate
positively and prominently.
Given that sales and new listings are weakly correlated, the new listing-inventory relationship
makes basic accounting sense. If sales (or new listings) surge, inventory will drop (rise) without
a contemporaneous surge in new homes listed for sale (sold). On the other hand, the weak link
between sales and new listings appears somewhat at odds with the stock-flow interpretation of
trade. The frequency of the SCWMLS data may play a role in depressing observed sales-new
listings co-movements. If it takes a few weeks (or a month as suggested by the simulations)
between agreeing to exchange and actually completing the deal rather than sales occurring
instantaneously, the observed link between sales and the flow of new homes for sales will be
depressed in monthly data.
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Table 6. Correlation Coefficients
Price Sales Listings Inventory Time on Market
Price 1.0 0.2370 0.4137 -0.4549 -0.3854
Sales 0.2188 1.0 0.8388 -0.2439 0.3632
Listings 0.2665 .1026 1.0 -0.2258 0.0151
Inventory -0.0921 -0.4264 0.5677 1.0 -0.2087
Time on market -0.0851 0.3222 0.2739 0.0537 1.0
Notes: SCWMLS data in italics. Simulated data in bold face
The last column in Table 5 reports standard deviations from the simulated data for the dLs
specification.30 Except for time on the market which should be viewed cautiously, the standard
deviations of these simulated statistics are all lower than in the observed data. Missing factors in
the model potentially account for this discrepancy. The more relevant point is that the ranking
and relative variations compare well with the data.31
The upper diagonal half of Table 6 reports the contemporaneous correlations from the sim-
ulations for dLs . The initial impression is mixed but given the data limitations, not unexpected.
Many listings never sell and apparently are withdrawn, whereas inventory will include houses
that are in the process of completing an agreed sale.
Contemporaneous inventories are inversely related to price in the model as one might plau-
sibly anticipate when many sellers are waiting for buyers. This shows up with lagged inventory
in the data. New listings in the model correlate very closely with sales and closely with price. In
the SCWMLS data, however, new listings and sales correlate very weakly whereas new listings
and price exhibit less co-movement than in the model. In the model a new listing will often
result in an immediate sale (and frequently with more than one bidder) thereby generating the
strong positive co-movements. The decision to enter rests on a high probability of a sale in a
competitive auction. In the model, the sale occurs immediately hence the tight link between new
listings and sales. In practice, it takes time to carry out a home sale and such delays potentially
generate such a discrepancy even if the model captures the essential trading process. Using
quarterly data Ngai and Sheedy (2015) report correlations of 0.602 and 0.850 for new listings
with price and with sales respectively which match up well with the model. Moreover, when the
listing does not sell immediately, sales are lower so inventory rises. In both the data and the
simulations, inventory and sales are inversely correlated with similar magnitudes.
Now consider new listings and inventory which are positively correlated in the data but
negatively in the simulations. In the model, if inventories become high, many markets will
experience cold spells without relaxed seller entry, hence the negative co-movement between
listings and inventory. Cold spells accompanying high inventories and low entry will have lower
30The mean for price is not comparable. The simulated model roughly matches mean sales for Madison. Mean
inventory equals 77 which for good reasons is much lower than in Madison.
31Ngai and Sheedy (2015) report several figures similar to the ones reported here. Using seasonally adjusted,
trending quarterly data, they find new listings are more volatile than sales whereas the Dane County and model
figures are very close. Ngai and Sheedy also report time to sell (not time on market), prices, and inventories.
Dı́az and Jerez (2013) also present a number of overlapping measures based on filtered, quarterly figures.
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sales thereby contributing to the negative inventory-sales relationship. In practice, sales do not
correlate - at least immediately - with listings as in the model, which, as discussed, yields a more
direct accounting relationship driving the observed listings-inventory data.
The relationships between time on the market and the non-price variables in the model
involve a number of interactions that also deserve discussion even if the measure of time on
the market from the SCWMLS data is limited. To organize ideas, first suppose inventories are
below average indicating there are relatively few markets experiencing cold spells of declined
entry. New listings will tend to be high as relaxed buyers are more likely to enter. Sales too
will tend to be above normal but these sales will not greatly affect time on the market. Sales
of homes that occur immediately after seller entry have no effect on the time on the market as
these homes come and go without quickly. Likewise, a sale from the existing stock of homes does
not lower the average time on the market. If such a sale is a random selection, it removes an
average duration home and hence has no immediate impact on the average time on the market.
After the sale, however, average time on the market in the existing stock continues to increase.
If new listings from entry of relaxed sellers are high due to low inventories and resulting sales
are high, time on the market can still rise and result in a positive and non-negligible sales-time
on the market co-movement as observed in the simulated as well as in the SCWMLS data.32
Now suppose inventories of unsold homes are high which will deter entry of many relaxed
sellers. A composition effect from the exogenous motivated seller entry potentially explains the
inventory-time on the market inverse co-movement found in the model. Average time on the
market falls (or rises more slowly) as new listings from such sellers do not find a existing buyer
and are added to the stock of homes for sale. As entry without an immediate sale is essentially
exogenous and scattered across all markets, it is more common when inventories are high. With
an above normal number of unsold homes, new listings by motivated sellers become more likely
not to sell immediately driving down average time on the market. The process in the observed
data may be more involved as actual trade takes some time and new listings that sell quickly
are sometimes around long enough to affect time on the market as well as inventory measures.
32Here the distinction between time on the market and time to sale might be particularly relevant. Ngai and
Sheedy (2015) find a strong strong negative link between new listings and time to sell. They further report very
little correlation between inventories and new listings.
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